Graph-based approaches have been widely employed to facilitate in analyzing network flow connectivity behaviors, which aim to understand the impacts and patterns of network events. However, existing approaches suffer from lack of connectivity-behavior information and loss of network event identification. In this paper, we propose network flow connectivity graphs (NFCGs) to capture network flow behavior for modeling social behaviors from network entities.
by using time sequence analysis [9] , machine learning [10] , and data mining [11] techniques to analyze the time-domain and high-order statistical characteristics of network flows. However, with the ever-increasing network size, massive network traffic, and increasing network applications based on encryption technology, despite the best efforts of manual analysis methods to accurately analyze network traffic, they seem to become expensive and time-consuming. On the other hand, signal processing-based methods cannot satisfy the demand of precise behavior analysis because of the coarse granularity and insufficient information. Hence, managing and monitoring networks is still challenging, and developing appropriate tools to analyze network flow behaviors has become a critical task.
Network flows record the communication process between source and destination hosts and produce raw data such as time stamp, IP addresses, port number, protocol, etc. Since each flow connects two hosts and ports, the connected patterns among network entities and applications can be used to describe network flow connectivity behaviors. Being effective intuitively and completely exhibiting the connected relations among interdependent data elements, graph-based approaches have unique strengths in analyzing and mining network flow connectivity behaviors [12, 13] . However, most graph-based approaches for network flow behavior analysis are based on plain graphs, in which the only information is the graph structure [14] . The flaw in this kind of method is that they cannot fully utilize available and important interactive information among network flows. Therefore, it has become a new trend to propose attributed graphs, in which nodes and edges exhibit attributes of abundant flow information.
In this paper, we propose a novel graph model called network flow connectivity graphs (NFCGs) to comprehensively monitor, analyze, and visualize network-wide flow connectivity relationships. In a NFCG, the nodes represent the IP addresses of network entities and edges represent their interactions. Different ranking values and attributes are set on the nodes and weights are given to the edges, which would facilitate NFCGs becoming more flexible and containing more detailed flow information than other graph models. We stress the importance of NFCGs by developing a flow-based network behavior analysis framework. In this framework, we start by designing filtering rules to remove insignificant and irrelevant nodes and edges for extracting the principal connectivity relationships and simplifying the graph scale. In order to obtain a more comprehensive and accurate description for graphs, NFCGs are regarded as complex network structures. Then we can leverage the feature analysis method of complex network theory to compute graph features of NFCGs. Without the need for prior knowledge of flow connectivity behaviors, those features can be used to profile network applications and detect network anomalies. Finally, we combine several graph mining methods with NFCGs to extract specified subgraph structures and individual flows for network event identification and digging out the root cause of network flow behaviors. Specifically, the contributions of this paper are as follows:
1) We propose NFCGs as an effective tool to study the connected relations of network flow data. Different from previous works based on plain graphs, we make the best of node-ranking values, edge-weight vectors, and various filtering rules to optimize graph so that NFCGs become more flexible, contain richer information of network flows, and can be simplified according to different research purposes. Moreover, we can directly obtain various flow-level features from NFCGs.
2) The occurrences of network events facilitate the corresponding changes in connected relations of network flows, and such changes can be reflected by specified patterns of subgraph structures. Therefore, compared to other graph-based approaches, by thoroughly analyzing the different connected patterns between normal and anomalous network flows, NFCGs have the ability to mine more suspicious and interesting subgraph structures.
3) We develop a NFCG-based framework and combine a series of complex network analysis and graph mining methods to monitor, analyze, and visualize network-wide flow connectivity relationships. Through experiments using real network traces, we verify the robustness, reliability, and effectiveness of the framework in profiling network applications, detecting anomalous behaviors, and digging out the root cause of network flows.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 briefly surveys related work on graph-based flow behavior analysis. Section 3 presents the NFCG construction method and a visualization example of NFCG. Section 4 starts by introducing a NFCG-based framework for network flow connectivity behavior analysis, then discusses the advantages and needs to use NFCG in network flow behavior analysis combined with graph mining analysis techniques. The experimental results are analyzed in detail in Section 5. Finally, we conclude the whole paper future prospects in Section 6.
Related work
Recent years have seen a surge of literature in the research area of network flow behavior analysis. To limit our scope, we now review some classical works that are most related to our work in network behavior analysis. In the literature, graph-based network flow behavior analysis can be divided into two categories: network-wide based approaches and host-level based approaches.
Network-wide based approaches mainly focus on network-wide connected relations. Karagiannis et al. [15] proposed the BLINC method to build logic graphs of node interaction. They utilized the difference among connected patterns of network applications for performing network classification, but ignored general connected relations of network flows. Traffic dispersion graphs (TDGs), which build on the work of Iliofotou et al. [16] , were used for monitoring network traffic and detecting unwanted applications. To the best of our knowledge, this was the first work to profile "who talks whom" relations at the network-wide level by using a directed graph model. Jin et al. [17] proposed traffic activity graphs (TAGs) to infer new applications and detect worm propagation. Furthermore, Asai et al. [18] proposed traffic causality graphs (TCGs) to analyze temporal and spatial causality of flows. High accuracy in application identification was achieved by using graph mining algorithm to extract the feature and a similarity measure in the feature vector space of TCGs. However, these approaches are plain graph models, which solely rely on the graph structures.
To detect P2P botnets in their waiting stage, Hang et al. [19] proposed a graph-based solution called Entelecheia that focuses on the "social" behavior of the botnet. Entelecheia exploits the inherent behavior of botnets by examining long-lived and low-intensity flows, and it would be increasingly complementary to other botnet detection approaches. Most recently, works closely related to our method are [20, 21] . They showed that graph-based approaches are successfully applied to link prediction in online social networks, such as Twitter, by feature extraction. However, the above approaches, which propose several graph measures, are not suitable in large-scale networks because of much more redundant information.
In host-level based approaches, in order to explore the connected relations between the source and destination IP hosts, bipartite graphs are often used in flow behavior analysis. Xu et al. [22] presented a bipartite graph and its one mode projection to study social behavior of Internet application traffic. Similar social behaviors of end hosts that show similar coefficient clustering could be used to detect emerging applications and anomalous traffic patterns. In [23] , Liu et al. represented all HTTP communications between clients and servers as a weighted, near-bipartite graph. Employing a two-phase alternating score propagation algorithm on the graph, they could identify suspicious clients in a monitored network. Many real applications can be modeled using bipartite graphs, such as users vs. files in a P2P system. Sun et al. [24] evaluated the quality of neighborhoods based on semantics of the graph datasets and also measured the performance of the anomaly detection with manually injected anomalies. However, with this kind of approach it is difficult to unveil the hidden relationships between different communities of network.
Network flow connectivity graphs
In this section, we introduce the construction of NFCGs and present the visualization of NFCGs. The detailed processes of NFCG construction are given below. create Aggre-Flows set AF ij = {AF ij 1 , AF ij 2 , AF ij 3 , · · · , AF ij n } , the set of aggregated flows originating from h i to h j 5: end for 6: end procedure 7: procedure Construct Network Flow Connectivity Graph(G =< V, E, R, W > ) 8: for all Aggre-Flows between h i and h j do 9: set up the vector set α v to represent the volume of flow connection,
Algorithm 1 Constructing Network Flow Connectivity Graph
set up the vector set α pn to represent the number of open ports opened during the time interval,
end for 12: for each h ∈ H do 13: ranking nodes based on the value of flow properties, and divide nodes into different levels R v (with different colorsp); weighting the edge e ij between h i and h j by
end for 15: end procedure 16: return Network Flow Connectivity Graph module G =< V, E, R, W > ;
Network flow information sequence generation
The traditional definition of network flow is converging packets that have the same properties, such as <srcIP, dstIP, srcPort, dstPort, protocol types >. Here we introduce the concept of Aggre-flow to generate the network flow information sequence, which is defined as meeting the following two conditions: a) these flows are between the same pair of IP addresses regardless of their protocol and opened port number; b) the time interval between network flows should be relatively small, so that two flows would not have any associated relationships in a long period of time. The steps for generating network flow information sequences are as follows:
1. Collect network traffic data and build network flow trace using the standard definition of 5-tuple flow.
2. Initialize the network flow trace; each flow is considered as an independent network.
3. Merge two flows into an Aggre-flow when two flows are between the same pair of IP addresses regardless of their protocol and opened port number. 4. Repeat step 3 until there are no more flows to converge, and then we will have the new network flow information sequence.
Original structure of NFCG generation using the flow information
Based on the new network flow information sequence, the original NFCG G =< V, E > is defined as a set of vertices, v i ∈ V , which represent network entities and edges, e ij ∈ E , which represent their interaction. The original graph shows whether there exists a connection between two entities like the plain graph model. With the development of network infrastructure, it is hard to performing accurate analysis based on whether two hosts have communication. Therefore, we intend to mine much more useful information from network flows, then combine this information with the original graph to construct a novel graph model, which could be more flexible and contain much more abundant information. 
Graph optimization of NFCG
Intuitively, many researchers believe that there are hierarchical structures in many kinds of networks [2] . In general, network flow data are often dispersed from high ranking level hosts (e.g., the nodes have large volume traffic flowing over them) to the low ranking level ones and aggregated to the high level hosts from the low level ones, respectively. For different ranking levels of hosts, they may have some similar connected patterns or distinct patterns. Therefore, in order to explore more detailed connected relations of network flows, we propose a ranking mechanism based on the statistics of network flow properties to classify nodes into different levels. Moreover, edges can be weighted so that they contain as much network flow information as possible. In a general form, we use the feature vector w i,j ∈ W to represent the weight of an edge. According to different research purposes, various feature vectors are selected, such as the number of packets during the interaction, ports number opened, live time of the flow connection, etc. Figure 1 shows the graph model comparison between TDG and NFCG under the same network flow dataset. With the graph visualization, it is clear that the NFCG can be extended to a rich representation of weighted graphs that show more network flow connectivity information by node ranking and an edge weighting mechanism. The embedding of this information helps us to comprehensively understand network flow connectivity behaviors.
Graph analysis for network flow behaviors
In this section we present the advantages and needs to employ NFCGs in accurately analyzing network flow behaviors with graph mining methods. Figure 2 shows the architecture of the network flow connectivity behavior analysis framework based on NFCGs. 
Extraction of principal connectivity relationships
One issue in the NFCG construction procedure is that it is infeasible to visualize all node pairs and edges due to the large-scale nature of networks. This is because when we select a large time window we may have numerous nodes to visualize and process, so the graph is difficult to analyze, but if we select a small time window, NFCGs become sparse to provide tenuous information about flow connectivity behaviors. On the other hand, there are some low rank level nodes that generate irrelevant or insignificant edges, and these edges can be seen as happening occasionally and easily make the analysis confusing.
To tackle the above issues, in order to accurately capture the principal connected relationships among network flows, we develop various filtering rules to remove the insignificant and irrelevant nodes and edges generated by network redundant information based on the quantity of flow attributes and select the edges whose weight is larger than a certain suitable threshold value.
Quantifying NFCG graph features
To enable our graph-based network flow behavior analysis, NFCGs are regarded as a type of weighted complex network structure. By drawing on the study of complex network science [25] , we compute three kinds of graph features to describe the behavior of network flow connected relations and use these features to offer the quantitative or semiquantitative analysis of network flow behaviors on diverse scales.
NFCG basic features describe the basic parameters of network topology, such as the number of nodes and edges, the average degree of nodes, and so on. The occurrence of network events would cause a sudden change of these features by increasing or decreasing nodes and edges, such as the spread of a worm leading to a substantial increase in this type of feature; the sudden shut down of FTP servers will result in the reduction of this feature.
NFCG status features represent the state and compactness of nodes and edges in the global structure of the network, including the node strength, the density of graph, cluster coefficient of node, cluster coefficient of the global graph, etc. Note that some network events would not cause the change of network topology, but they would have an impact on the status of nodes and edges. For example, alpha flow does not change the connectivity relations of nodes, but will make the number of flow connections increase so that the edge weight and node strength will change; NFCG basic features may not have a change although DNS request failure happens, but the status features may change since the connected structure would develop into a bi-mesh structure from a star structure.
NFCG statistical features exhibit the probability distribution, the uncertainty and stability degree of nodes and edges including node degree distribution, the entropy and variance of the node degree distribution, the mean, variance, entropy of joint degree distribution, and so on. In most cases, NFCG statistical features of network flow behavior show an almost random pattern as time varies. However, some of the event occurrences can break this law. As an example, some DDoS attacks may not have an effect on the other two features but can easily lead to the significant changes of entropy of source IP addresses and destination IP addresses.
The idea of using these graph features is devoted to summarizing various network connected patterns. Figure 3 shows an illustrative example for graph features of different connected structures. By the use of these features we facilitate a quantitative or semiquantitative analysis method to profile network flow connectivity behavior and detect anomalous flow behaviors, which will be introduced in Section 5.
Structure analysis for NFCGs

Specified subgraph structure selection
The occurrences of network events would facilitate changing connected relations among network flows, which can cause the varying of subgraph structures. How can we single out specified subgraphs related to network events? Here we can obtain the connected subgraphs by removing irrelevant nodes and edges based on the filtering rules. Then we utilize the different inherent characteristics of network flow behaviors in subgraph patterns to identify network events. Depending on different research purposes, the corresponding filtering rules are different. For example, in order to discover scan activity flow behaviors, an edge filtering rule based on the number of destination ports opened is adopted. Which subgraph is able to affect more nodes and edges in a NFCG? The largest giant connected component could give the answer. Thus, we choose to use the traversal method of graph theory to acquire several giant connected components and then analyze the influence degree of them. Furthermore, we also extract the subgraph that has the highest clustering coefficient to show the dense relationships and similar community structures over the entire NFCGs.
Similarity analysis for graphs
Nowadays large-scale network group events are often merged by a number of complicated events, and the occurrence of these events often hides the associated connections. The graph representation of network group events is a connected pattern where multiple nodes connect with the same node sets. However, since these events are caused by the same or similar reasons, a certain similarity will appear in network flow information. It is hard to discover these events if only taking whether there is a connection between two hosts into consideration. For example, if we use TDG to analyze the network group events, many suspicious subgraph structures can be found, but they are unable to further identify which one is the real subgraph pattern related to events. Nevertheless, if we use NFCGs to model connectivity of network flow behavior, aiming at the similar characteristics of network group events, we can analyze the correlation of edges' information through similarity measures. Edges that have high similarity are closely associated with network group events, regardless of whether they are normal or abnormal. To this end, with the use of graph similarity analysis, the NFCG is more suitable for detection and identification of network group events than the TDG method.
Frequent patterns mining for flow items
In a NFCG, there are two cases existing in edge representation: 1) one edge with relative high flow features (e.g., having large volume packet transmission), and 2) multiple edges between two nodes, which are divided into two categories, including main connected pattern and sharing connected pattern. The main connected pattern refers to the case in which one or a few flows account for the majority of all flows, while each flow among the sharing connected pattern is average. When these above situations exist in the network, although using the TDG-based method could represent the flow connection, it cannot interpret the role of network flows and determine which flows are more special or important than others. In addition, the role feature of each host in network flows may be changeable as hosts perform distinct behaviors in different research environments. Thus, it is an urgent need to accurately mine the roles of hosts and dig out the root causes of network flows.
To address this problem, our approach uses the frequent items mining method [26] at individual host level to extract the dominant connected pattern of network flow data. We show the top k frequent items of the flow table, which capture the majority volume of network flow data. We have found that the proposed scheme is especially useful to find interesting or suspicious patterns hidden in massive network flow data.
Experiment results and discussion
In this section, we evaluate the proposed method using real network traces. There are two backbone network traces used for evaluation, CAIDA OC-48 and WIDE traces. The CAIDA OC-48 trace is captured in both directions of an OC-48 link in 2003, and traffic traces in this dataset are anonymized using CryptoPAn prefixpreserving anonymization. All traces in this dataset are anonymized with the same key. In addition, the payload has been removed from all packets. This link is a west coast peering link for a large ISP. The WIDE trace is taken at the US-Japan trans-Pacific backbone line (a 150 Mbps Ethernet link), for which all IP addresses are anonymous but 40 bytes of application layer payload are kept for each packet. Figure 4 shows a NFCG with 1000 flows of CAIDA-48 link by using GraphViz tools [27] . Figure 5 shows an example of four kinds of subgraphs extracted from a NFCG. The first subgraph represents the subgraph in which each edge contains more than 1000 different ports during their interaction. This subgraph structure could be marked as having suspicious port scan behaviors since there may be a few ports opened for normal network flow connection. A strong correlation subgraph is extracted by calculating the value of the edges' weight. Such a subgraph, in which edges have high similarity with each other, refers to the behavior involving many hosts caused by the same source, e.g., distributed network behaviors. However, this subgraph structure is usually unnoticeable and hard to detect by the TDG model since TDG concentrates on the structure characteristics of graph. By employing the depth-first search and breadth-first search method, the largest giant connected component could indicate whether there exists a core connection in the graph structure, and the core connection often represents some important devices in the network, such as network server, network administrator, etc. The last subgraph shows us the strongly connected structure of the NFCG. Extracting this kind of subgraph could help us to discover more of the community structure, which could be used to conduct community structure mining in the communication network.
Subgraph extraction from NFCG model
Profiling network applications with NFCG graph feature analysis
Network flow connectivity graphs capture the global level communication and interaction patterns between network flows. These graphs are primarily driven by flow connected activities or behaviors. In our experiment, we use the edge filtering rules (destination port-based filter, i.e. UDP Port 53 for DNS and TCP 80 Port for HTTP) to analyze known network applications. Table 1 shows measured features for 8 known application NFCGs with a 120 s window. Figure 6 shows the rich club connectivity of different network applications and the curves of the empirical complementary cumulative distribution functions (CCDF) of node degree distribution, respectively. Rich club connectivity is typically analyzed with the following procedure [13] : first sort nodes in the order of decreasing node degree rank value, then calculate the connectivity at degree k. We compute the number of edges that exist between the group of nodes from rank 1 to rank k; after that, we compute the maximum possible number of edges between those nodes, and the ratio of the actual value and maximum possible value is the rich club connectivity. Figure 7 shows the joint degree distribution of 8 known application NFCGs within a 120 s window. Joint degree distribution is described as p(k1, k2) giving the probability of a randomly selected edge to connect nodes of degree k1 and k2. Clearly, by analyzing the graph features these port-based NFCGs can accurately present their inherent interactive characteristics.
Separating normal flow behaviors from network anomalies
By the fact that network anomalies can bring severe problems to network operation and maintenance, it is crucial to detect and identify them as soon as possible. Many anomalous behaviors are trying to camouflage themselves as normal flow behaviors, and a portion of them usually use known opened ports for propagation. As network anomalies give a rich representation of graph structures, in our method they are useful for separating network anomalies from normal flow behaviors. We validated our experiment with three kinds of synthetic anomalous network flow behaviors: email spammer, DDoS attacks, and worm spreading. These three types of anomalies occupy transport layer ports 25, 80, and 4662, respectively, while these ports are used for SMTP, HTTP, and eDonkey applications normally.
When a spammer uses an email account to send a large number of spam emails every day, the number of email recipients of this account will show a large increase when spamming is taking place. Alternatively, the "spammer" host may choose to take over a computer to sign up for millions of email accounts [28] , each of which is used to send a few spam emails every day. In this case, the number of account sign-ups from this computer will show a large increase in a short time.
When a DDoS attack happens [29] , a lot of distributed machines will send network packets to victims and cause the quantity of distinct source IP addresses in network flows to increase suddenly. In our case, we compare the HTTP-flooding behaviors with normal HTTP too discover the differences between them.
In eMule-worm spreading, the worm spreading usually starts from one or several sources and expands to a large scale of hosts in the network very quickly [29] . Each infected host will try to connect to other hosts to spread the worm as quickly as possible. Such behavior will cause the number of connections or probes from these infected hosts to increase suddenly. Table 2 shows the difference of NFCG graph features between normal applications and anomalous behaviors. From the table, it is clear that the average degree of NFCGs under impact of the email spammer is less than SMTP behaviors, but there is considerable change in MCD and In.nodes ratio. Furthermore, although DDoS is particularly similar to normal HTTP behavior in the graph structures, the MCD of DDoS is quite larger than normal HTTP behaviors as there are a number of hosts communicating with uncommon website severs. Finally, the depth of eMule-Worm is greater than eDonkey behaviors due to the propagation characteristics of worms. Not surprisingly, although these network anomalies want to use the same port for evading detection, their inherent characteristics can betray them compared to normal flow behaviors. As a consequence, NFCG graph features can be devoted to effectively detecting and identifying anomalous network flows.
Root cause analysis for network flow connectivity behaviors
To verify the effectiveness of our method of identifying the types of network flow behaviors, we have conducted experiments for digging out the root cause of network flows through using frequent subgraph mining at individual node level. The experiment is validated with 5 min of flow data of the CAIDA OC-48 link. Table 3 lists the top 5 frequent items of source IP addresses among network flows. The first row represents an HTTP service provider because the source port number is #80. The second item is a remote login control behavior since the source host generated 2621 flows targeting 2620 hosts through TCP port #23. However, it is likely the premonition of botnet infection or DDoS attacks for the reason that the source IP address is connecting too many hosts for remote controlling, and this would attract the attention of network monitors. The fourth item is identified as a kind of suspicious port scan behavior by the fact that 69.31.231.186 connects to only one destination host with few source ports and a large amount of different destination ports opened. Unlike the above flow behaviors, the last one is marked as alpha flow activity as a large volume of data is exchanged between two hosts, while a number of source ports are opened as much as the destination ports (237.13.231.163 is the IANA reserved IP address used for multipoint transmission). We have also analyzed connectivity behaviors of destination hosts. For this purpose, the frequent item of the destination port is our research object. The final output of the experimental results is given in Table 4 . In the first line, it recorded that there are 724 source hosts connected to 0.3.117.73 with 2409 source ports and 10 destination ports being opened. However, through dominant analysis we have found that in a total of 2610 flows there are 2600 flows for destination port #80 (TCP). Therefore, 0.3.117.73 is probably an HTTP proxy or server, and this case is similar to the third and fourth items in Table 4 . In the second flow item, the destination IP address 140.129.86.228 has been established with 1797 flows with 1797 different destination ports opened, but one of 22 source ports has 1766 flows (port #21, often used for FTP service). This occurs because 140.129.86.228 is an FTP server (through an IP lookup tool we found that the IP host belongs to the Taiwan Academic Network (TANet) Information Center). The last item of Table 4 shows a suspicious port scan behavior, for which there are two source hosts scanning a total of 690 destination ports of target host 115.35.86.99 by generating 690 flows. These data demonstrate that by combining the frequent item mining method, NFCGs can be used in mining the root cause of network flows and helping identify the types of network anomalies.
Conclusion
In this paper, we propose a novel graph model called NFCG for accurately analyzing and comprehensively mining network flow behaviors. To this end, NFCG construction can be seen as the first and most important step for deeply inspecting network flows. The main novelty of our proposed method is that we utilize node-ranking values, edge-weight vectors, and various filtering rules to optimize graph construction so that NFCGs become more flexible and contain richer information of network flows. To explore the best of our proposed method in network flow behavior analysis, we have developed a NFCG-based framework and conducted different experiments to analyze NFCGs. Experiment results using real network traces have shown that NFCGs are effective and suitable for network flow behavior analysis and the NFCG-based analysis framework will contribute a lot to helping those traditional methods in areas that require detailed analysis of network objects, such as network flow classification, network fault diagnosis, and network intrusion detection. For our future work, as we only demonstrated our method by historic network data, a live-monitoring approach based on NFCGs is the next step. Also, throughout the research we focused on connectivity behaviors among IP addresses, but in some particular cases of network events IP addresses are mostly bogus in spoofed-DDoS attacks, so extra data filtering schemes are necessary and worth exploring as well.
